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There exist limits of self-inspection due to self-referential paradoxes, incompleteness and fixed
point theorems. As quantum mechanics dictates the exchange of discrete quanta, measurements
and self-inspection of quantized systems are fundamentally limited.
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I. EMBEDDED OBSERVERS AND
SELF-EXPRESSION
The study of physics and science in general [1, 2] and,
in particular, any attempt to measure a physical state
while at the same time not disturbing this very state,
resembles the Baron Munchausen pulling himself and
the horse on which he was sitting out of a mire by his
own hair. Physics is grounded in reflexivity and self-
inspection and is bound to epistemology; there is no di-
rect access to ontology (any claim regarding the latter
is metaphysical and remains conjectural). Empirical ev-
idence can solely be drawn from operational procedures
accessible to embedded [3–7] observers. Embeddedness
means that intrinsic observers have to somehow interact
with the object, thereby altering both the observer as
well as the object inspected.
Physics shares this feature with computer science as
well as the formalist, axiomatic approach to mathemat-
ics; actually, this article could be interpreted as a pro-
legomenon to formal (in)completeness, as subsumed by
Lawvere [8] and Yanofsky [9]. There, consistency re-
quirements result in limits of self-expressivity relative to
the axioms (if the formal expressive capacities are “great
enough”). Indeed, as expressed by Go¨del (cf. Ref. [10,
p. 55] and [11, p. 554]), “a complete epistemological de-
scription of a language A cannot be given in the same
language A, because the concept of truth of sentences of
A cannot be defined in A. It is this theorem which is the
true reason for the existence of undecidable propositions
in the formal systems containing arithmetic.”
A generalized version of Cantor’s theorem suggests
that non-trivial (that is, non-degenerate, with more than
one property) systems cannot intrinsically express all of
its properties. For the sake of a formal example [9,
p. 363], take any set S and some (non-trivial, non-
degenerate) “properties” P of S. Then there is no onto
function S −→ PS, or equivalently [12] S × S −→ P,
whereby PS represents the set of functions from S to
∗ svozil@tuwien.ac.at; http://tph.tuwien.ac.at/˜svozil
P. Stated differently, suppose some (nontrivial, non-
degenerate) properties; then the set of all conceivable
and possible functional images or “expressions” of those
properties is strictly greater than the domain or “descrip-
tion” thereof.
For the sake of construction of a “non-expressible de-
scription” relative to the set of all functions f : S −→ PS,
let us closely follow Yanovsky’s scheme [9]: suppose
that, for some non-trivial set of properties P we can de-
fine (that is, there exists) a “diagonal-switch” function
δ : P −→ P without a fixed point, such that, for all p ∈ P,
δ(p) 6= p. Then we may construct a non-f -expressible
function u : S −→ PS by forming
u(a) = δ(g(a, a)), (1)
with g(a, a) = [f(a)](a).
Because, in a proof by contradiction, suppose that
some function h expresses u; that is, u(a1) = h(a1, a2).
But then, by identifying a = a1 = a2, we would obtain
h(a, a) = δ(h(a, a)), thereby contradicting our definition
of δ. In summary, there is a limit to self-expressibility
as long as one deals with systems of sufficiently rich ex-
pressibility.
II. REFLEXIVE MEASUREMENT
In a very similar manner we identify A with measure-
ments M, and P with the set of possible outcomes O of
these measurements. Alternatively, we may associate a
physical state with P .
For the sake of construction of a “non-measurable
self-inspection” relative to all operational capacities let
us again closely follow the scheme involving the non-
existence of fixed points. In particular, let us assume that
it is not possible to measure properties without changing
them. This can be formalized by introducing a distur-
bance function δ : O −→ O without a fixed point, such
that, for all o ∈ O, δ(o) 6= o. Then we may construct a
non-operational measurement u : M −→ OM by forming
u(m) = δ(g(m,m)), (2)
2with g(m,m) = [f(m)](m).
Again, because, in a proof by contradiction, suppose
that some operational measurement h could express u;
that is, u(m1) = h(m1,m2). But then, by identifying
m = m1 = m2, we would obtain h(m,m) = δ(h(m,m)),
thereby again clearly contradicting our definition of δ.
In summary, there is a limit to self-inspection, as long
as one deals with systems of sufficiently rich phenomenol-
ogy. One of the assumptions has been that there is no
empirical self-exploration and self-examination without
changing the sub-system to be measured. Because in or-
der to measure a subsystem, one has to interact with it;
thereby destroying at least partly its original state. This
has been formalized by the introduction of a “diagonal-
switch” function δ : P −→ P without a fixed point.
In classical physics one could argue that, at least in
principle, it would be possible to push this kind of dis-
turbance to arbitrary low levels, thereby effectively and
for all practical purposes (FAPP) eliminating the con-
straints on and limits from self-observation. One way
of modelling this would be a double pendulum; that is,
two coupled oscillators, one of them (the subsystem as-
sociated with the “observed object”) with a “very large”
mass, and the other one of them (the subsystem associ-
ated with the “observer” or the “measurement appara-
tus”) with a “very small” mass.
In quantum mechanics this possibility is blocked by the
discreteness of the exchange of at least one single quan-
tum of action. Thus there is an insurmountable quantum
limit to the resolution of measurements, originating in
self-inspection.
III. INTRINSIC SELF-REPRESENTATION
Having now explored the limits and the “negative” ef-
fects of the type of self-exploration and self-examination
embedded observers are bound to we shall now exam-
ine the “positive” side of self-description. In particular,
we shall proof that, at least for “nontrivial” determin-
istic systems (in the sense of recursion theory and, by
the Church-Turing thesis, capable of universal computa-
tion), it is possible to represent a complete theory of itself
within this very system.
To avoid any confusion one must differentiate between
determinism and predictability. As has already been
pointed out by Suppes [13], any embodiment of a Tur-
ing machine, such as in ballistic n-body computation [14]
is deterministic; and yet, due to the recursive undecid-
ability of the halting problem, certain aspects of its be-
haviour, or phenomenology, are unpredictable.
The possibility of a complete formal representation of
a non-trivial system (capable of universal computation)
within that very system is a consequence of the recursion
theorem [9] and Kleene’s s-m-n theorem: Denote the par-
tial function g that is computed by the Turing-machine
program with description i by ϕi.
Suppose that f : N −→ N is a total (defined on its
entire domain) computable function. Then there exists
an n0 ∈ N such that ϕf(n0) = ϕn0 . For a proof, see
Yanofsky [9].
The s-m-n theorem states that every partial recursive
function ϕi(x, y) can be represented by a total recursive
function r(i, x) such that ϕi(x, y) = ϕr(i,x)(y), thereby
hard-wiring the input argument x of ϕi(x, y) into the
index of ϕr(i,x).
Now we are ready to state that a complete formal rep-
resentation or description of a non-trivial system (capa-
ble of universal computation) is given by the number
n0 of the computable function ϕn0 which always (that
is, for all input x) outputs its own description; that is,
ϕn0(x) = n0.
For the sake of a proof, suppose that p : N × N −→ N
is the projection function p(m,n) = m. By the s-m-
n theorem there exists a totally computable function r
such that ϕr(y)(x) = p(y, x) = y. And by the recursion
theorem, there exists a complete description n0 such that
ϕn0(x) = ϕr(n0) = p(n0, x) = n0.
IV. SUMMARY AND RELATION TO
COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE
RANDOMNESS POSTULATE
It has been argued that it is possible to have a complete
theory of any deterministic physical system which has
the capacity to embody universal computation. How to
obtain such a complete theory is an altogether different
issue, as the rule inference problem is undecidable [15–
18].
Such complete theory or self-representation of every-
thing is no entitlement to omniscience, as, due to the
reduction of the halting problem, it is in general impos-
sible to predict certain behaviours.
Moreover, self-inspection is limited by its paradoxical
character, as in general measurements change the physi-
cal state. This is, in particular, relevant in quantum me-
chanics, when discrete quanta are exchanged. Quantum
and automata complementarity [19], and complementar-
ity in general [20], are related to finite (reversible [21])
systems.
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